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DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE-THEN AND NOW
THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE--THEN AND NOW
BY HUGH EVANDER WILLIS
Anyone who would like a thorough understanding of the back-
ground behind the Dartmouth College Case should read Senator
Beveridge's great discussion of this case in his Life of John
Marshc. 1 In his discussion Beveridge gives the history of the
founding by a missionary named Wheelock of the Little Indian
School in the state of New Hampshire; how Wheelock sent one of
his Indian youths and another missionary to England to raise
funds for his enterprise; how the Earl of Dartmouth and others
responded to their appeal; how Governor Wentworth of New
Hampshire in the name of the Sovereign granted a charter to
Wheelock for his school, establishing a Board of twelve trustees,
giving a majority of seven of them the power to do anything and
everything they might think proper, and giving Wheelock, made
President, the power by his last will to appoint whomever he
might choose to succeed himself as President; how Wheelock by
his will made his son his successor as President of the College;
how theological differences divided the young President and one
of the strongest and most newly appointed members of his
Board of Trustees; how a church quarrel in Hanover entered into
the college situation; how the trustees removed young Wheelock
from office; how the Federalists came to support the cause of the
trustees and the Republicans that of Wheelock; how the Republi-
cans elected a new governor of New Hampshire and the legis-
lature of New Hampshire passed an act changing the name of
Dartmouth College to Dartmouth University, increasing the num-
ber of trustees from twelve to twenty-one, providing for a board
of twenty-five overseers with the veto power over the acts of
the trustees, and giving the governor and council of the state the
power to appoint the overseers and to fill up the existing number
of trustees to the number of twenty-one, thereby annulling the
charter of the college and bringing it under the control of the
legislature; how the governor and council appointed new trustees
and overseers; how the old trustees continued to run the college;
how the trustees of the university removed the old trustees of
1 4 Life of John Marshall (1919) 220.
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the college and the president and the professors who adhered to
them; how the new regime ousted the old faculty from the college
buildings and elected Wheelock president of the state institution;
how the college faculty procured quarters in a neighboring build-
ing and continued their work; how William H. Woodard, who for
years had been secretary and treasurer of the college, had in his
possession the records, account books and seal of the college, and
declined to recognize the college trustees and acted for the Board
of the university; how the college trustees removed him from
his position on the college Board and brought suit against him
in the Court of Common Pleas for the recovery of the original
charter, the books of record and account, and the common seal.
The only question which the United States Supreme Court
considered was whether or not the legislature of New Hampshire
by its legislation with reference to Dartmouth College had vio-
lated the provision in the United States Constitution against the
state's impairment of the obligation of a contract. The court
might have held that the grant of a charter to Dartmouth Col-
lege was only an act of legislation which could be repealed as any
other act of a legislature can be repealed. The King could not
have annulled the charter, but Parliament could have done this.
New Hampshire succeeded to the powers of Parliament and,
therefore, the court might have held New Hampshire could do
this.2 But the court refused to take this position. The court
might have taken the position that the college was a public cor-
poration rather than a private corporation, in which case the pro-
tection of the constitutional provision would not have been avail-
able. 3 It did not, however, take this position. The court might
have taken the position that a charter is not the kind of a con-
tract protected by the Constitution because a grant, but the
Supreme Court had already held that the protection of the con-
tract clause applied to grants as well as to executory contracts, 4
and the Supreme Court held in this case that a charter of a
private eleemosynary corporation is a contract between the state
251 American Law Rev. 711, 720; Denham, The Dartmouth College Case
(1909) 7 Mich. L. Rev. 201, 207, 211.
3 Laramie County v. Albany County (1875) 92 U. S. 307; The Dartmouth
College Case (1931) 19 Georgetown L. Rev. 411.
*Fletcher v. Peck (1810) 6 Cranch 87; State of New Jersey v. Wilson
(1812) 7 Cranch 164.
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and the corporation, between the state and the members of the
corporation, and between the corporation and its members. The
Chief Justice in an obscure way found consideration and all the
other essential elements of a contract. The court might have
held that even though the charter of a corporation was a contract
that it was subject to the sovereign powers of eminent domain,
taxation and the police power. In that case the only question
before the court would have been whether or not there was a
sufficient social interest for the law passed by the legislature of
New Hampshire to make it a proper exercise of the police power.
The court might very well have found that it was not a proper
exercise of the police power, and for that reason a violation of the
United States Constitution, but if it had decided the case on that
ground, it would have left all contracts subject to the exercise of
these sovereign powers. The court did not take this position,
but the position that the charter of a corporation is protected
against the exercise of such powers; at least, this was the con-
struction put upon the Dartmouth College Case by the cases which
immediately followed it, and the cases following it also uniformly
accepted the proposition that the doctrine of the Dartmouth Col-
lege Case was applicable to all kinds of private business corpora-
tions.-- Yet the courts have always held that private contracts
between private individuals are subject to the exercise of these
sovereign powers.0
The effect of this decision was the creation of a corporate capi-
talistic civilization in the United States. For fifty years it pro-
tected private corporations against political action and had much
to do with the extraordinary development of private corporations
in the United States. Everywhere corporations were springing
up in response to the necessity for larger accumulations of money
and more constant business units. Marshall's opinion afforded
an extraordinary stimulus to this natural economic tendency.
It gave both encouragement to business and aligned the economic
forces of corporate organizations on the side of national develop-
ment. It gave to the railway corporations, soon to begin, a basis
5Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co. (1863) 1 Wall. 116; Piqua Bank v.
Knoop (1853) 16 How. 369.
6 Manigault v. Springs (1905) 199 U. S. 473; Munn v. Illinois (1876)
94 U. S. 113.
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of credit which secured full play to the economic forces by which
the achievement of cultivating the soil of the North American
continent was performed. Justice Story says of the opinion that
it "will check any undue encroachments upon civil rights, which
the passions or the popular doctrines of the day may stimulate
our State Legislatures to adopt." Chief Justice Marshall in an-
other decision 7 gave the following as the occasion and general
purpose of the contract clause:
"The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and
creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes
home to every man, . . . had been used to such an excess
by the state legislatures, as to break upon the ordinary inter-
course of society and destroy the confidence between man
and man. This mischief had become so great, so alarming,
as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and threaten
the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people,
and destroy the sanctity of private faith."
To guard against the continuance of this evil was one of the ob-
jects of deepest interest to the Constitutional Convention and one
of the most important benefits expected from the Dartmouth Col-
lege decision. Chief Justice Hughes, in a recent case,8 said:
"The wide-spread distress following the revolutionary period
and the plight of debtors had called forth in the states an ig-
noble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors
and the invasion of contractual obligations. Legislative in-
terferences had been so numerous and extreme that the con-
fidence essential to prosperous trade had been undermined
and the utter destruction of credit was threatened. ...
It was necessary to interpose the restraining power of a cen-
tral authority in order to secure the foundations even of
'private faith.'"
Within the last ninety years the tendency has been strongly away
from some of the doctrines of the Dartmouth College decision,
but the doctrine that the charter of a corporation is a contract
still stands, and the Dartmouth College Case not only inspired
confidence in the business world, but taught the American people,
as Beveridge says, "that faith once plighted, whether in private
contracts or public grants, must not and cannot be broken by
state legislation."
7 Ogden v. Saunders (1827) 12 Wheat. 213, 354.
8 Home Building and Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell (1934) 54 S. Ct. 231.
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Since the date of the decision of the Dartmouth College Case,
many changes have occurred both in constitutional law and in
corporate development. Some of the changes in corporate organ-
ization and our capitalistic system have been the result of new
forms of social control of them permitted by later decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. But some of the most important
changes in our capitalistic system and corporate organization
have been the result of the capitalistic system and the corpora-
tions themselves.
After Chief Justice Marshall's retirement from the bench, it
was soon discovered that the doctrine of the Dartmouth College
Case, which protected corporations against social control after
the issuance of a charter to them, was extending undue protection
to corporations and endowing them with the power to do many
unsocial things. Since corporations had nothing to fear after
they once got a charter, all they had to be concerned about was to
get a charter of the sort they desired. As a consequence, for
years the corruption and bribery of state legislatures by railway
and other corporations became almost a scandal. When it gradu-
ally became more difficult for corporations to procure the char-
ters they wanted in this way, all they had to do was to run to
Delaware or New Jersey. States like these were only interested
in revenue from franchise taxes. They were not interested in
what the corporations they might charter might do to other states.
Hence, if corporations were willing to pay their license fees, these
states were willing to grant them any charters they might desire
and even to enact new laws to satisfy the needs and demands of
new corporations and then to send such corporations out to prey
upon the rest of the country. If these corporations were en-
gaged in interstate commerce, the other states had absolutely no
redress, and it was not until two or three years ago that any state
discovered that it had any redress against corporations engaged
in intrastate commerce, 9 and as yet the states generally have not
availed themselves of the new protection available to them. For
this reason, in the course of time the doctrine of the Dartmouth
College Case began to be modified.
The first modification of the Dartmouth College Case was made
by the adoption by the Supreme Court of a rule of strict construc-
9 Railway Express Agency v. Virginia (1931) 282 U. S. 440.
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tion. This rule was first announced in the case of Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge.'0 The opinion in this case was written
by Chief Justice Taney, and it was the first opinion read by him
after his appointment as Chief Justice. In this case the state
of Massachusetts had incorporated the Charles River Bridge
Company to build a bridge betveen Boston and Charleston and
to take tolls for forty years, which time was within a few years
extended to seventy years; but the charter said nothing about the
monopoly of the Charles River Bridge Company nor the exclusion
of other bridge companies. Later the state of Massachusetts in-
corporated the Warren Bridge Company to build another bridge
within a few rods from the first bridge and to be a free bridge
after six years. The Charles River Bridge Company sought an
injunction, but the Supreme Court, under the rule of strict con-
struction, held that it was not entitled to it but that the second
bridge company was privileged to go ahead and build its bridge.
This rule of strict construction was followed in many subsequent
cases of the Supreme Court." The effect of this decision was to
enable the states to protect their general social interests against
the operations of self-seeking corporations so long as they had
poor charters, but the final effect of this decision was to make the
corporations more careful as to the language in their charters.
Attorneys for corporations exercised more and more care and
became more and more expert in drafting corporate charters.
Thereafter, the rule of strict construction had very little operative
effect.
As a consequence, a second method for limiting the effect of
the Dartmouth College decision was tried. The states in con-
stitutions and general statutes began to insert provisions forbid-
ding the grant of irrevocable charters and reserving the power
to alter or repeal them. The Supreme Court held that such limi-
tations were valid on the theory that they became a part of the
obligation of the contract in any charter, so that later repeal or
alteration of terms of contracts did not impair their obligation. 12
21 (1837) 11 Pet. 420.
11 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (1878) 97 U. S. 659; Stein v. Bienville
Water Supply Co. (1891) 141 U. S. 67; Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville
(1906) 200 U. S. 22.
12 Greenwood v. Freight Co. (1881) 105 U. S. 13; Covington v. Kentucky
(1899) 173 U. S. 231.
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However, a great many corporations had procured their charters
before the enactment of these provisions, and some states did not
incorporate such limitations in their constitutions or general
statutes.
As a result, in the course of time some cases came before the
United States Supreme Court which showed up the fallacy of the
Dartmouth College decision in such a clear light that the Supreme
Court did what Marshall and his associates should have done at
the time of rendering the decision. It tended to place the con-
tracts of corporations with the state upon the same basis as pri-
vate contracts in general. Dissenting judges had always con-
tended that a state could not abrogate its sovereign powers of
eminent domain, taxation and police. 13 Finally, with a change
in the personnel of the bench, these dissenting judges attracted
enough other judges to their position so that they obtained a ma-
jority upon the Supreme Court bench. They first prevailed in
eminent domain cases, and the Court held that all charters of a
corporation were subject to the exercise of this sovereign power.14
Later they held that the charters of a corporation were subject to
the exercise of the police power: first, as to public morals; 15 then
as to public health; 16 then as to public safety; 17 and, finally, as to
economic social interest.' The state of Mississippi had char-
tered a lottery for a period of twenty-five years. Three years
thereafter in a new state constitution and a statute enacted pur-
suant thereto, all lotteries were forbidden in the state. Quo war-
ranto proceedings were brought against corporations operating
lotteries, and the question was whether or not their charters were
protected against this exercise of the police power. The Su-
13 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) 4 Wheat. 518;
Piqua Bank v. Knoop (1853) 16 How. 369; The Washington University v.
Rouse (1869) 8 Wall. 439.
14 The West River Bridge Co. v. Dix (1848) 6 How. 507; Long Island
Water Co. v. Brooklyn (1897) 166 U. S. 685. The Tennessee Valley Au-
thority is authorized to use private processes patented by the United States
Patent Office in its production of commercial fertilizers, but this is not a viola-
tion of the obligation of any contract because it is provided that reasonable
compensation shall be paid, and this is therefore a proper exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Note (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 815, 822.
, Stone v. Mississippi (1879) 101 U. S. 814.
16 Butchers etc. Co. v. Crescent City Co. (1884) 111 U. S. 746.
17 New Orleans v. Louisiana Light Co. (1885) 115 U. S. 650; Texas etc. Co.
v. Miller (1911) 221 U. S. 408.
18 Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1892) 146 U. S. 387.
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preme Court, in the case of Stone v. Mississippi, held that the
social interest in morals could be protected in spite of the fact
that the charter was a contract. The state of Louisiana gave a
slaughter-house company a monopoly on the butchering business
in the city of New Orleans for twenty-five years. Ten years after
this grant the state adopted a new constitution which repealed
the monopoly features of all prior charters except those of rail-
road companies, and the city of New Orleans opened butchering
to competition. A new slaughter-house company started busi-
ness, and the first slaughter-house company asked for an injunc-
tion, but the Supreme Court, in the Butchers' Union Slaughter-
House etc. Co. v. The Crescent City etc. Slaughter-House Co., held
that (for the protection of health) the first charter was subject to
the exercise of the police power found in the new state constitu-
tion. A Louisiana statute gave an exemption from liability for
death. A corporation was incorporated under this statute. A
later statute imposed liability for death caused negligently, and
this corporation was guilty of causing the death of an employee
through its negligence. When sued the question which was
raiged was whether or not the later statute could impose any
liability on it in view of its charter, but the Supreme Court, in
the case of Texas etc. Co. v. Miller, held that the charter was sub-
ject to the exercise of the police power for the protection of
safety. The state of Illinois, in 1869, granted to the Illinois Cen-
tral Railway Company in fee all of the state's rights to the sub-
merged lands under Lake Michigan in the Chicago Harbor for
a distance of one mile from the shore, including a thousand acres
of land. The grant was in perpetuity. In 1873, the Illinois
legislature repealed this grant. Bills in equity were filed to de-
termine the rights of the parties to the land involved, and the
Supreme Court, in the case of Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Illinois,
held that the repeal was constitutional as a proper exercise
of the police power to protect the social interest in economic
progress, because all grants are made subject to the police power
of the state. These decisions subjected the charters of corpora-
tions to so many different exercises of the state's police power
that the natural inference would be that they were subject to any
and every form of police power, but the Supreme Court has as
yet refused to apply this modification of the Dartmouth College
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss3/3
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Case to the regulation of the rates of public utilities, but has
steadfastly held that charter provisions as to rates are contracts
which cannot be varied or changed by the state's police power
over rate-making. 19 Up to the present time, the Supreme Court
has also continued to hold that charter provisions in contracts
are not subject to later modification by the state's exercise of its
power of taxation.20 The taxation cases and the rate cases are,
of course, contra to the eminent domain cases and all the other
police power cases. The Dartmouth College Case should have
held at least that if a charter of a corporation is a contract it is
subject to the exercise of all of the sovereign powers of police,
taxation and eminent domain. The Supreme Court has corrected
the original mistake except for taxation and the fixing of the
rates of public utilities. These exceptions are indefensible and
doubtless in the course of time will be eliminated by the Supreme
Court, and taxation and rate cases will be made to harmonize
with other police power and eminent domain cases.
In the recent case of Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell,2l Chief Justice Hughes used this language:
"Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to
fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into con-
tracts as a postulate of the legal order. . . . Whatever is
reserved of state power must be consistent with the fair in-
tent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The re-
served power cannot be construed so as to destroy the limi-
tation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the
reserved power in its essential aspects. . . . There has
been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the neces-
sity of finding ground for a rational compromise between
individual rights and public welfare. . . . The question is
no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against
another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the
economic structure upon which the good of all depends."
19 Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Ry. Co. (1902) 184 U. S. 368; Cleveland v.
Cleveland City Ry. Co. (1904) 194 U. S. 517; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water
Works Co. (1907) 206 U. S. 496; Columbus etc. Co. v. Columbus (1919) 249
U. S. 399; St. Cloud Public Service Co. v. St. Cloud (1924) 265 U. S. 352.
20 Piqua Bank v. Knoop (1853) 16 How. 369; The Washington University
v. Rouse (1869) 8 Wall. 439; Roberts etc. Co. v. Emmerson (1926) 271 U. S.
50; Lake Superior etc. Mines v. Lord (1926) 271 U. S. 577.
21 (1934) 54 S. Ct. 231.
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As a result of these modifications of the Dartmouth College
Case, corporations and our capitalistic system have been sub-
jected to a great deal of social control to which they were not sub-
ject for many years after the Dartmouth College decision, and the
indications at the present time are that they will be subjected to
much greater social control in the future.
Capitalism, during its history, however, has worked more
changes in itself than has the Supreme Court through its modifi-
cations of the Dartmouth College decision. Adam Smith 22 gave
six characteristics as the characteristics of capitalism: private
property, private enterprise, individual initiative, the profit
motive, wealth, and competition. Practically all of these char-
acteristics as Adam Smith understood them have disappeared.
In Adam Smith's day, private property or ownership consisted
of the unity of interest in the enterprise, of power over it, and of
acting with respect to it. By the nineteenth century in industry
the first two only belonged to the owners, who hired managers to
perform the third. Now all three have been separated and the
people who call themselves owners own only an interest in the
enterprise. Their situation is practically that of creditors who
have loaned money, only for dividends instead of interest. In
the same way, corporate enterprise has supplanted private enter-
prise. Under the modern quasi-public corporation, where the
wealth of the many has been placed under the control of a few,
the property owner has surrendered the direction of his wealth
for the wages of capitalism. He has no responsibility. Indi-
vidual initiative also has gone. At first, in the United States,
individualism expressed the agricultural economy. Then the
traders, craftsmen and capitalists, crying, "Laissez faire," set
themselves free from old restrictions. Laissez faire, starting as
a liberation of individualism, has, however, developed one of the
worst forms of tyranny, although it is still justified and defended
in the name of freedom. The responsible individual entrepreneur
has been replaced by the non-responsible corporation which has
succeeded to the position formerly occupied by the feudal lord.
Corporations have thrived upon the investment of the thrifty and
the accumulations of the many and the exemption from personal,
22 The Wealth of Nations.
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social and political responsibility. More recently, because the
credit structure is the core of modern finance, the banker and his
scheme of values have been set up at the head of the corporations,
and money has become king. This consummation has been ac-
complished behind a screen; yet it is none the less an accomplish-
ment. The power of financiers and industrialists has become
so great that they have come to be spoken of as "the interests"
and as an invisible government. Thus, within the superficial
framework of a political structure, postulated on free and indi-
vidual farmers, there has been built up an economic hierarchy
which has reduced individuals, concentrated very largely in our
cities, to dependent salary and wage workers. The profit motive,
which the classical economists so much emphasized, no longer
operates as they prophesied that it would. The modern owners
under our corporate system get the profits, but this does not moti-
vate them to a more efficient use of their property, for they have
no control. Any spiritual values which used to attach to their
ownership are gone. The wealth of stockholders is determined
by others. It fluctuates, is liquid, but cannot be employed by
them. They own only a symbol of ownership. When they were
in control there was at least an assumption that they would oper-
ate their business for their own interests. There is no longer
any guaranty that their business will be operated even in this
way. Those in control do not directly get the profits and may not
be interested in profits for the stockholders. Since those in
control of our quasi-public corporations do not get the bulk of the
profits, they cannot be motivated by the profit motive. When it
is remembered that the power over our huge corporations is not
in the shareholders, nor the bondholders, nor the employees, nor
the public consumers, but in the hands of a relatively few called
management, the implications of the situation begin to appear.
Those in control are very likely to desire profits, but under our
present set-up, if they would gain profits they must do so through
selling to the corporations which they manage, things which
they themselves own, or by wrecking the corporations, or by
shifting profits to subsidiary companies which they own, or by
speculation on the stock market. Competition also in modern
times has ceased to operate in the way planned for it by the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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classicists. Business has now developed so that it is character-
ized either by monopoly or by cut-throat competition.23
Thus, all of the characteristics of capitalism emphasized by
Adam Smith have disappeared. The cause of these changes has
been the corporation. It cannot be emphasized too much that
these changes and the present plight of capitalism are not due to
social control but to the fact that corporations in the respects
that caused these changes have been permitted to operate
without "social control. In the United States, the history of
capitalism may be divided into four periods: (1) the pre-
industrial or agricultural period prior to 1840; (2) the corporate,
industrial period, from 1840 to 1880; (3) the period of corporate
monopoly, from 1880 to the World War; and (4) the period of
corporate finance, from the World War to date. The corporation
at first provided a means through which private business trans-
actions of individuals could be carried on. Then it provided a
method of property tenure. But with the advent of quasi-public
corporations, it has organized our economic life. The concen-
tration of economic power in the United States has-become such
that in 1930 two hundred non-banking corporations controlled
49 per cent of the corporate wealth other than banking. Adam
Smith combatted corporations as unfit to accomplish the results
which he advocated; yet today, though corporations dominate
our economic life and have dethroned all of Adam Smith's gen-
eralizations, the disciples of Adam Smith still both continue to
acclaim his doctrines and the institution of the corporation. The
terms and concepts remain, but the economic conditions have
changed. New terms and new concepts are imperatively needed.
But more than this is needed. The changes in the structure
of capitalism worked by corporate organization and development
have created an economic order which has become, for the time
being at least, unworkable and will continue to be unworkable un-
less the operation of capitalism is essentially changed. With the
new development in our corporate organization and with the
profit motive largely exempted from social control, there has re-
sulted a concentration of wealth which has given 2 per cent of
23B erle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
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our population about 65 per cent of our wealth. 24 In order
to make the capitalistic system operate, there is an economic
law that somewhere there must be a purchasing power equiva-
lent to the producing power. With the introduction of new ma-
chinery and the technological device of mass production, the
problem of production has been entirely solved. It has been
solved so well that it has outrun purchasing power to such an
extent that we are now suffering the consequences of it in this
depression. In order to cure our depression, the principal thing
needed is the creation of new purchasing power. At the present
time, purchasing power abroad is not available, and probably
never will be again except in so far as it can be obtained by a
planned national economy. The 2 per cent of our population
which own 65 per cent of our wealth has this purchasing power
but it does not want to use it for the purpose of buying goods,
if indeed it could, but it wants to use it either for the production
of more goods or for purposes of investment. That means that
the rest of our population, which owns only 35 per cent of our
wealth, must do all the buying, and this seems to be proving a
job too great for their accomplishment. The solution of this
problem is now one of the major tasks of the Roosevelt admin-
istration. The constitutionality of the Roosevelt program in-
volves not only the doctrines of the Dartmouth College Case, but
many other constitutional doctrines and limitations.
In concluding this paper, the writer will undertake only to
show the application of the modified principles of the Dartmouth
College Case to present day legislation, state and national. In
other words, he will undertake to show to what extent state and
national legislation recently enacted in his opinion is a violation
of the provision in the Constitution against the impairment of
the obligation of contracts. This provision in the Constitution is
an express limitation only upon state legislatures, but due process
of law, which is a limitation on all branches of the federal govern-
ment, includes the impairment of the obligation of a contract,
24 Report in 1915 of Commission on Industrial Relations; Edie, Principles
and Problems of Economics (1926) chap. 25; Gemmill, Contemporary Eco-
nomic Problems, chap. 21; Garver & Hanson, Principles of Economics (1928)
chap. 31; Taussig, Principles of Economics (1927) vol. 2, chap. 55.
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so that the legislation of Congress probably has just as much
limitation as does the legislation of the states.25 In addition,
Section 4 of Fourteenth Amendment provides that: "The validity
of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, includ-
ing debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for serv-
ices in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be ques-
tioned." This provision probably applies to future debts and not
merely to those existing at the time of the adoption of the amend-
ment and, therefore, is also another limitation on the federal
government so far as the public debts are concerned, comparable
with the contract clause.
Recently a vast number of new laws, retroactive in effect, prin-
cipally for the benefit of debtors, have been passed both by the
states and the federal government. The state laws have been in
the nature of moratory legislation, staying the execution of judg-
ments, or judicial proceedings, or foreclosure of mortgages, or
extending the period of redemption, or prohibiting loans or
payment of cash surrender value by insurance companies, or
liberalizing exemption laws, or abolishing deficiency judgments
and foreclosure by advertisement. The federal laws have re-
lated to such topics as the gold content of the dollar, gold hoarding,
and gold clauses in contracts.
Is any or all of this legislation unconstitutional because of its
impairment of the obligation of contracts? We will first con-
sider some of the state legislation. Stay laws which do not place
a fixed and arbitrary time limit but place the matter in the hands
of the courts for them to exercise their discretion are constitu-
tional. This was so decided in the celebrated case which the
United States Supreme Court decided on January 8, 1934.20 This
is exactly what was provided by a Minnesota law, and the United
States Supreme Court upheld the law. In announcing the de-
cision for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes said:
"The obligations of a contract are impaired by a law which
renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them.21
25 Sinking-Fund Cases (1878) 99 U. S. 700, 718; United States v. Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 51.
26 Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell (1934) 54 S. Ct. 231.
27 Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819) 4 Wheat. 122.
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"This principle precludes a construction which would permit
the state to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the
destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce
them.. But it does not follow that conditions may not arise
in which a temporary restraint of enforcement may not be
consistent with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional
provision and thus be found to be within the range of the re-
serve power of the state to protect the vital interests of the
community. . . . Whatever doubt there may have been
that the protective power of the state, its police power, may
be exercised-without violating the true intent of the pro-
vision of the federal Constitution-in directly preventing
the immediate and literal enforcement of contractual obliga-
tions by a temporary and conditional restraint, where vital
public interests would otherwise suffer, was removed by our
decisions relating to the enforcement of provisions of leases
during a period of scarcity of housing.28 . . . Contracts
are made subject to this exercise of the power of the state
when otherwise justified."
Where, instead of giving a discretion to the courts, the legis-
lature stays the execution of a judgment or judicial proceedings
or foreclosure of a mortgage for a stated time, the law would
probably be held bad by the United States Supreme Court; but
where there is an extension or enlargement for a stated time of
the period of redemption from the foreclosure of a mortgage or
for the sale for non-payment of taxes, the law might be upheld,
provided the period was a reasonable period. 29 The foreclosure
by advertisement could probably be abolished by a retroactive
statute, but the abolition of a deficiency judgment would probably
be unconstitutional although it probably would be constitutional
to require a separate action at law.30 A law permitting the
mortgagor to continue in possession without the payment of rent
for the value of the use of the property would also probably be
unconstitutional. A dictum in the Blaisdell case seems to be to
28 Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U. S. 135; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feld-
man (1921) 256 U. S. 170.
29 Bronson v. Kinzie (1843) 1 How. 311; Hooker v. Burr (1904) 194 U. S.
415. This case allows redemption from a tax sale before a sale to a third
party purchaser.
30 Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Mora-
toria (1933) 1 Univ. of Chi. L. tQ. 249; Small, Legality of State Legislation
for Debtor's Relief (1933) 11 N. Y. Univ. L. Q. 183.
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this effect. After the Civil War many attempts to liberalize the
exemption laws, as by the exemption of the homestead, were at-
tempted, but the Supreme Court held them to be illegal.3 1 This
form of relief for debtors has not been attempted at the present
time, but if it should be attempted the courts would probably con-
tinue to hold it illegal unless the exemptions were very small.
The abolition of imprisonment for debt has been held by the courts
to be constitutional.3 2 The prohibtion of loans by insurance
companies and the prohibition of the payment of cash surrender
value by insurance companies are both probably valid because
within the principle of the Blaisdell case.
The fixing of the gold content of the dollar by the executive
branch of the federal government through authorization by Con-
gress is undoubtedly constitutional. Congress has been given the
express power to "coin money" and "regulate the value thereof."
The delegation of the power to the executive branch of the govern-
ment is not a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers
because the executive branch of the government is not thereby
legislating, but is administering a standard set-up by Congress.33
The gold hoarding order also is undoubtedly constitutional.
The federal government does not have this power given to it as
an express power, but it should be held to be a power implied from
the power to regulate the value of money. That it is not a vio-
lation of the doctrine of separation of powers should be answered
for the same reason that was given in the case of the change in
the gold content of the dollar. However, in the case of the gold
hoarding order, a question of due process is involved. There is
some question whether the government in requiring the delivery
of gold coin, bullion or certificates to the treasury for an equiva-
lent amount of any other form of coin or currency is exercising
the power of eminent domain or exercising a police power. In
either event, it would seem that the person from whom the gold
is being taken is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
If the power is an exercise of the power of eminent domain, he
would also be entitled to a jury trial and to just compensation,
31 Gunn v. Barry (1872) 15 Wall. 610.
82 Penniman's Case (1880) 103 U. S. 714.83 Hampton v. United States (1928) 276 U. S. 394.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss3/3
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE-THEN AND NOW
and it might be doubtful whether the payment of an equivalent
amount of any other form of coin or currency would be just com-
pensation. If, however, the power is an exercise of the police
power, no compensation would have to be made. It is the opinion
of the writer that in this matter the federal government is exer-
cising a police power and not the power of eminent domain. The
government is not taking private property for a public use, but
is regulating the use of money by its people. Furthermore, it
is doubtful whether or not money is subject to the power of emi-
nent domain. This is a proper exercise of the police power be-
cause of the social interest in a stable currency. 34
The legislation abrogating the gold clauses in private and pub-
lic contracts involves no different question of dual form of govern-
ment or separation of powers than do the pieces of legislation
which have just been considered, but the abrogation of the gold
clauses does raise a most difficult question under the due process
clause. There is no question that Congress has the power to pre-
scribe what shall be legal tender.35 In the case of Bronson v.
Rodes,3 6 the Supreme Court held that the Legal Tender Acts did
not apply to the gold clauses in private contracts, but in that case
it did not hold that Congress lacked the power to make them
apply. Since Congress in its recent legislation has expressly
declared that such clauses are against public policy, forbidden
their insertion in later obligations, and provided for the discharge
of obligations, whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, by the
payment dollar for dollar in any coin or currency which at the
time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts, and
since Congress has also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
to require the giving up of the possession of gold coins, the ques-
tion is now directly raised. However, it is the opinion of the
writer that the government may cancel gold clauses provisions
in its own contracts under its power to define what shall be legal
tender and also because of the fact that the government cannot
be sued without its consent; and that the government may over-
34 43 Note (1933) Yale L. J. 497; Note (1933) 82 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 395.
35 Legal Tender Cases (1870) 12 Wall. 457; Juilliard v. Greenman (1884)
110 U. S. 421. These cases overruled the earlier decision of Hepburn v.
Griswold (1869) 8 Wall. 603.
' (1868) 7 Wall. 229.
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ride the gold clauses in private contracts because of its power
over legal tender and its authority to call in gold coins. So long
as there is an embargo on the possession and use of gold coin, the
government has rendered it impossible to perform the condition
in the contracts, and therefore it should be held to frustrate the
contracts. Where there is a sale of a commodity, a clause in a
private contract should have operative effect; but where such a
contract simply creates a debt, the situation is different. Govern-
ment has the power to say what shall be the legal tender for the
payment of debts. If there are two legal standards, one gold
and the other lawful money, a clause for the payment in gold, of
course, would prevail; but where there is only one legal standard,
and that is payment in any legal tender, the gold clauses should
be held to amount to nothing. Changing the legal tender from
two standards to one is due process of law.37
So far as the gold clauses are concerned, it should also be held
that Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment places no greater
limitation on the federal government than does the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. 38
All of which means that as the Supreme Court in John Mar-
shall's day protected corporations against social control only to
allow them almost to ruin our capitalistic system; so the Supreme
Court of today will subject corporations to social control in the
hope of saving capitalism.
87 Barry, Gold (1933) 20 Va. L. R. 263, 274, 288, 294, 296; Nebolsine, The
Gold Clauses in Private Contracts (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 1051; Post and Wil-
lard, The Power of Congress to Nullify Gold Clauses (1933) 46 Harv. L. R.
1225; Hanna, Currency Control and Private Property (1933) 33 Col. L. R.
617, 645.
38 But see Eder, 14th Amendment-A Forgotten Section (1933) 19 Cornell
L. Q. 1, where a position contrary to that taken by the writer is maintained.
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